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Robert C. H. Sweeny 
C'est un autre avenir qu'il faut qu'on re'invente 
Sans idole ou mod2le pas ri pas humblernent 
Sans verite' trace'e sans lendemains qui chantent 
Un bonheur invente' de'finitivernent 
[...l 
Au nom de l'ide'al qui nous faisait cornbattre 
Et qui nous pousse encore c? nous battre aujourd'hui.' 
The end of the Cold War has fuelled an important debate in left academic circles of 
the advanced capitalist c~untr ies .~ The issues are not new, but the dramatic changes 
of the past four years in the world's geo-political situation place them in a new light. 
Although this debate is about the future of socialism, it is largely an historical debate 
and this on two distinct levels. What lessons are to be learned from the failure of the 
Soviet Union? And in light of that failure, what are the intellectual, political and 
cultural traditions that can or should be drawn upon in the building of an alternative 
socialist strategy? As aMarxist historian who works on the development of capitalism 
in Qutbec and Canada, I find this renewed debate both stimulating and disturbing. 
Stimulating because of the variety and richness of the traditions offered up for 
inclusion, from Enlightenment ideas to environmental activism, but also disturbing 
because of the quite one-sided nature of this critical re-assessment. Almost all the 
participants in this debate denounce the effects of a dogmatic, sclerotic, Marxism 
upon the former Warsaw Pact countries, but surely forty years of Cold War politics 
have just as strongly influenced thinking in the advanced capitalist countries. I believe 
it would be both ahistorical and short-sighted to think that either the relative autonomy 
of past intellectual work or the enticements of present post-modern theory can save 
us from some difficult soul-searching of our own. For those of us still on the left, 
however that may be defined, the struggle for socialism in the 1990s necessarily 
involves an ongoing, rigorous, critical, theoretical and practical debate about the 
relationship between the human sciences and the dominant social order. In the present 
context and as part of this debate, it is particularly important for those of us working 
or studying in the universities to be critically aware of the manner in which our own 
intellectual practices and disciplines have been transformed by more than forty years 
of Cold War politics. 
The urgency of this critical self-examination is highlighted by the seriousness of 
1 Jean Ferrat, Le Bilan (Paris 1980). 
2 An important theme in the inaugural issue of left history, the wide-ranging nature of this 
debate is illustrated by the collection drawn largely from the pages of New Left Review: 
After the Fall: The Failure of Communism and the Future of Socialism edited by Robin 
Blackburn (London 1991). 
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the present geo-political situation. The spectre now stalking Europe, indeed most 
advanced capitalist countries, is not communism, but the ghost of the 1930s. The 
problem is the enormity of the task. This article focuses on the Annales and it was 
chosen as a starting point for two reasons. First, not only is it the most influential 
school in 20th century historical theory and method, but it was at the centre of both 
the pre-war debates on history and the social sciences and those of the 1950s and 
1960s on interdisciplinarity and the human sciences. Thus, the significance and 
meaning of its legacy should be of interest to more than just historians. Second, 
according to the prevailing historiographical consensus, this influential journal's 
theory and method evolved in a progressive manner, through difficult times, from its 
founding by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch in 1929 to its flowering under the 
direction of Fernand Braudel in the 1950s and early 1 9 6 0 ~ . ~  Indeed, this continuity 
was an important element in Immanual Wallerstein's recent characterization of this 
school as being the primary centre for a critical challenge to the hegemonic discourse 
of the Cold War in E ~ r o p e . ~  In short, the Annales constitutes a good test case, for if 
I am correct in asserting that critical thought in Western academic life was trans- 
formed by the Cold War, then it should be evident in the evolution of the Annales' 
theory and method. 
My argument is simple enough. The Annales school initiated in the period between 
the wars a new type of historical theory and method, which constituted a significant 
intellectual challenge to existing historiographical practices. It was not a revolution- 
ary challenge, but its particular form of oppositional humanism, influenced by the 
philosophy of Henri Bergson, retains a resonance that is not without relevance in 
these troubled times. In the immediate post-war period, however, the direction of the 
journal abandoned certain key Bergsonian concepts, notably his definitions of time 
and memory. This rejection of the philosophical foundations of the early Annales 
approach to history resulted in a radical transformation in both their theory and 
method. These changes were so important that I believe it is misleading to speak of 
"an" Annales school prior to 1968. There were at least two schools of historical praxis 
which used that name and I will argue the dividing line between the two was that very 
Cold War year of 1949. 
In order to understand the significance of this paradigmatic shift it is necessary to 
explore, perhaps all too briefly, Bergson's rather unusual definitions of time and 
memory, before discussing why they constituted a challenge to the dominant histo- 
3 For the early years see H. Stuart Hughes, The Obstructed Path: French Social Thought in 
the Years qfDesperat ion,  1930-1960 (New York 1968); Carole Fink, Marc Bloch, A Life in 
History (Cambridge 1989); AndrC Burgikre, "Histoire d'une histoire: la naissance des 
Annales," Annales ESC, 6 (novembre-dkcembre 1979) 1344-1359. For broader overviews 
see the published proceedings of the Fernand Braudel Centre's conference on the impact of 
the Annales on the social sciences in Review,  1: 314, (1978); Traian Stoianovich, French 
Historical Method; The "Annales" Paradigm (Ithaca 1976); Peter Burke, The French 
Historical Revolution. The Annales School 1929-89 (Stanford, 1990); and Jacques Revel, 
"Histoire et sciences sociales: les paradigmes des Annales," Annales ESC 6 (novembre- 
dtcembre, 1979), 1360-1376. 
4 "Beyond Annales?"Radical History Review,  No. 49. (1991). As the founding director of 
the Fernand Braudel Centre, Wallerstein is the scholar who has perhaps most contributed 
to the prestige enjoyed by the Annales in North America, which of course pales in 
comparison with its reputation in Latin America and Western Europe. 
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riographical practice in France. Bergson himself thought the problems he identified 
in historical practice were so insurmountable, that they effectively denied the possi- 
bility of a scientific discourse of proof in history. Thus, the problems faced by the 
founders of an historical school based on Bergson's ideas were significant. As we 
shall see, the solutions proposed by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch were different 
and therein lies a partial explanation of the rapidity of the subsequent abandonment 
by Febvre of Bergson's durke rkelle in favour of Braudel's longue durke. In conclu- 
sion, I will illustrate and then briefly discuss the importance of this paradigmatic shift. 
Bergsonian Time & Memory 
Henri Bergson was an enormously influential philosopher in the early years of this 
century. Most of his principal works were published before the Great War, although 
he would survive to be one of the first Jews in France to be a victim of Nazi genocidal 
pol icie~.~ Born in 1859, the year Darwin published On the Origin of Species, Bergson 
was to develop an organic epistemology that integrated into a philosophical world- 
view the most recent biological and psychological research with a critique of classical 
physics. He argued that understanding reality provides the key to the meaning of 
life. His perception of the nature of reality was highly original. The central idea of 
all of his work was that movement is the only given aspect of real it^.^ For Bergson, 
however, this movement was through time, not through space. Thus understanding 
reality involves not only an appreciation of the centrality and complex character of 
5 He died of pneumonia contracted after standing all day in the Parisian rain waiting to be 
registered as a Jew. Ironically, his death preceded by one day the special exemption 
accorded Marc Bloch by the Vichy authorities. All references to Bergson's work in this 
article are from the standard, centennial edition, in two volumes, Oeuvres and Mtlanges 
(Paris 1959). The former contains Essai sur  les donne'es imme'diates de la  conscience 
(1889); Mati ire  e t  me'moire (1 896); Le Rire (1 900); L'e'volution cre'africe,(l907); L'e'nergie 
spirituelle, (1919); Les deux sources de la  morale et de la re'ligion (1932) and La pense'e et 
le mouvant (1934). The latter contains two works, L'ide'e de lieu chez Aristote (1889) and 
Dure'e e t  simultane'ite' (1922) as well as the essays, articles and correspondence that were 
published in his lifetime. 
6 My appreciation of the degree to which Bergson attempted to keep abreast of current 
scientific research and, in the case of physics was clearly conceptually in advance of much 
of that research, was greatly enhanced by reading Milic Capek, Bergson and Modern 
Physics, A reinterpretation and  re-evaluation (Dordrecht 1971). Hubert Watelet has re- 
cently suggested that the dramatic changes in physics in the early twentieth century also 
strongly influenced the development of the initial global paradigm of the Annales school. 
Hubert Watelet, "Les rapports entre science et culture et les paradigmes du mouvement des 
Annales" in La construction d'une culture. Le Que'bec et ['Ame'rique franqaise Edited by 
Gtrard Bouchard & Serge Courville. (Sainte-Foy 1993), 221-250. 
7 "On s'est beaucoup occup6 de ma conception de la durie, mais il est rare qu'on ait mis 
I'accent sur le  point essentiel, sur ce qui a 6t t  l'id6e directrice de toutes mes recherches. Je 
formulerais cette id6e de la manikre suivante: tandis que nos facultts naturelles de percep- 
tion et de conception, construites en vue des nkcessitts d e  I'action, croient I'immobilitt 
aussi r tel le  que le mouvement (la croient m&me anttrieure au mouvement est fondamentale, 
le mouvement venant s'y surajouter), les problhnes philosophiques ne sont susceptibles de 
solution que si, par une inversion de ces habitudes de penser, nous arrivons a apercevoir 
dans la  mobilit6 la seule realit6 donn6e. L'immobilitB n'est qu'une vue (au sens pho- 
tographique du mot) que notre esprit prend sur elle." Me'langes, 1417-1418. 
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time, but a critique of how spatial biases have distorted our perception of time. 
Bergson argued that human beings have a spatial bias which encourages a false 
perception of immobility. This illusion of the primacy of changelessness and imrno- 
bility is the result of the distorting influence of our sensory perceptions combined 
with our socially defined codes for dealing with the material world, principally our 
languages, both of which privilege spatial over temporal data. These partial and 
distorting sensory inputs and language structures are proper to our species' evolu- 
tionary development. Bergson argued that this evolution had also led to a distortion 
in our perception of time. Life is acontinuous, dynamic and active process of making 
choices in order to act on and in the material world. In order to survive and flourish 
i11 this world, he argued that the human brain has been structured through evolution 
to direct its attention to the future and away from the past. Although this useful 
characteristic of the human species is understandable, according to Bergson, one 
cannot deduce from it either the meaning of life or the fundamental nature of reality. 
For to do so, as many philosophers have done, would inevitably lead to the dangerous 
illusion that the past no longer exists.' Although limited by our false understanding 
of reality due to these spatial biases and misleading perceptions of time, according 
to Bergson, we are not their prisoners. We can transcend this false understanding 
through an intuitive process wherein the dynamic role of memory enables us to 
understand the reality of temporal movement and change. Understanding the tempo- 
ral nature of reality, which he called the durge rkelle, allows one to see the past as 
real and linked to the present through a creative movement of becoming. In Bergson's 
worldview, therefore, time shares the same characteristics as reality itself, it is 
indeterminate, heterogeneous and indivisible. 
I think that it is important to understand what Bergson meant when he used these 
terms, for not only do they explain in part the great appeal that Bergsonian philosophy 
enjoyed and perhaps the rapidity of its subsequent eclipse, but they defined to a 
significant degree the theoretical and methodological agenda of the first Annales 
school. 
If the only fixed, unchangeable aspect of reality is movement through time, then 
the only constant is change itself and therefore reality is not pre-determined. This 
indeterminacy is not absolute, because the movement of reality is through time. Thus 
reality has a direction, but it is temporal not spatial and so time is heterogeneous in 
two ways. Not only is the past different from the present and the present different 
from the future, but the continuous and indeterminate nature of temporal movement 
means that the idea of a singular present is illusory; for if the continuous and 
8 "C'est que si le changement est reel et m&me constitutif de la realite, nous devons envisager 
le  passe tout autrement que nous n'avons et6 habitues B le faire par la philosophie et m&me 
par le langage. Nous inclinons A nous representer le passe comme de I'inexistant, et les 
philosophes encouragent chez nous cette tendance naturelle. Pour eux et pour nous, le 
present seul existe par lui-m&me: si quelque chose survit du passe, ce ne peut Etre que par 
un secours que l e  present lui pr&te, [...l par I'intervention d'une certaine fonction particu- 
liere qui s'appelle la memoire e t  dont le r61e serait de conserver exceptionnellement telles 
ou telles parties du pass6 en les ernmagasinant dans une espece de boite. - Erreur profonde! 
erreur utile, je le veux bien, necessaire peut-&tre B l'action, mais mortelle B la spBculation. 
On y trouverait, [...l la plupart des illusions qui peuvent vicier la pensee philosophique." 
From La pensie  e t  le mouvant in Oeuvres, 1385. 
Time and Human Agency 67 
heterogeneous past were to culminate in a single moment of the present, it would 
necessarily imply a determinancy to that past. Finally, time is indivisible, since any 
dividing line between past and present would be an artificial, unreal device outside 
time. 
Bergson argued that the indeterminate, heterogeneous and indivisible nature of 
this temporal movement into the present is best conceived as a creative evolutionary 
process. To conceive reality as a creative temporal process of becoming was both 
radically unconventional and potentially empowering. Bergson's conceptualisation 
of time, in combination with the centrality of the role he assigned to memory, 
constituted the basis for an appositional humanism, which challenged both religious 
and scientific norms. Indeed, Leszek Kolakowski has described it as an instrument 
of liberation? For Bergson, in this creative movement of becoming was to be found 
the meaning of life: 
If, then, in every province, the triumph of life is expressed by creation, ought we not 
to think that the ultimate reason of human life is a creation which, in distinction from 
that of the artist or man of science, can be pursued at every moment and by all men 
alike; I mean the creation of self by self, the continual enrichment of personality by 
elements which it does not draw from outside, but causes to spring forth from itself?l0 
For Bergson, this internal, human creativity was the meaning of life, because it 
expressed the fundamental nature of reality. He argued that we can only understand 
the meaning of life by overcoming the limitations inherent in the very nature of our 
material life. Since for Bergson reality is indeterminate, heterogeneous and indivis- 
ible temporal movement, then the past is real, with no break between it and the 
present. Each individual human consciousness can perceive the reality of this existing 
past because of the ability of the human mind to transcend the spatial biases of our 
perceptions and our languages through an intuitive interrogation of memory. Thus 
our creativity is based on a realisation of the continuing existence of the past, whereby 
we become one with the temporal movement of reality. 
Memory was central to this dialectic of transcendence and understanding, because 
for Bergson memory was not apartial recollection of the past. All of the past continues 
to exist in memory because memory is the living past." Bergson was careful to 
distinguish between recollections of the past, which he called souvenir-images, and 
the living past in memory, souvenir-pur.I2 He did so because the phenomenon which 
9 Leszek Kolakowski, Bergson (Oxford 1986), 5 .  To which I would add the important proviso 
that it was a bourgeois instrument, for it was a philosophy of individual, rather than social, 
liberation. I do not mean to suggest here that Bergson was personally antagonistic to 
socialist movements, quite the contrary - see his sympathetic analysis of Chartism in 
Me'langes, 1095-1098. However, despite the influence his thinking had on such social 
theorists as George Sorel, Bergson's philosophy was essentially individualist and in the 
face of what Alain Guerreau has called the bourgeois dilemma in philosophical thought of 
the 20th century - the choice between irrationalism and God - Bergson chose God. 
10 "Life and Consciousness." The 1911 Huxley Lecture, University of Birmingham, in 
Melanges ,  932. The emphases were in the original. 
11 " ... la  mtmoire n'a donc pas besoin d'explication. Ou plutBt il n'y a pas de facult6 spdciale 
dont le rBle soit de retenir du pass6 pour le verser dans le prisent. Le pass6 se conserve de 
lui-meme, automatiquement." From La perception du changement,  in Melanges ,  910. 
12 See in particular De la  survivance des  images l a  memoire e t  l ' i spr i t  in Oeuvres ,  276-316. 
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needed explaining, from his perspective, was not memory, but our ability, indeed 
propensity, to forget. He argued that we forget because we are essentially active 
beings. If we were constantly aware of the totality of the living past, it would impede 
our ability to choose and to act. This impediment in the material world would be fatal. 
Thus the partial nature of recollections allows us to function successfully in the 
present, precisely because they do not overwhelm us with the totality of the past. 
These partial recollections are, nevertheless, part of memory and could, Bergson 
argued, act as gateways to the infinitely larger living past. 
One of the most remarkable aspects of Bergsonian philosophy, therefore, was that 
it re-interpreted time and memory in a manner which re-asserted the centrality and 
meaning of individual experience. In the context of early twentieth-century European 
'thought, this was no mean achievement. Whereas nineteenth-century scientific 
research on time, in particular the geologists' discovery of deep time,I3 had tended to 
dwarf into insignificance the human experience, Bergson argued for the great 
significance of not only human experience in general, but each individual in particu- 
lar. Bergsonian time meant that the very meaning of life was to be found in the 
flowering of individual creativity, itself an expression of reality. In this perspective, 
psychological factors were not limiting, but liberating. So although contemporaneous 
with the establishment of psychology as a distinct discipline, Bergson's analysis of 
memory and consciousness was rigourously anti-determinist. Neither archetypes nor 
other mysterious constructs of our unconscious determine our actions, rather our 
consciousness in the form of memory enables each of us to understand and be part 
of reality. 
The Bergsonian Challenge to History 
Undoubtedly, Bergson's unconventional and potentially empowering ideas contrib- 
uted to his popularity and impact before the Great War. I have not found any evidence, 
however, that Bergson's ideas significantly influenced the French historical profes- 
sion until years after the guns had fallen silent.14 In light of the importance of his 
reflections on time, this delayed impact is significant, because it highlights the close 
relationship between the socio-cultural role of history as a discipline and the concep- 
tualisation of time. Inasmuch as the early Annales critique of French historiography 
was influenced by a Bergsonian conceptualisation of time and memory, it would 
necessarily involve a re-evaluation of this socio-cultural role for history as a disci- 
pline. 
Before the Great War, French historical methodology was dominated by the ~ c o l e  
des chartes, with its strongly empirical bent and its exclusive preoccupation with 
written documents. Positivist in origin, this analytical method15 presupposed that time 
13 Stephen Jay Gould, Time's Arrow and Time's Cycle, Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery 
of Geological Time (Cambridge 1987). 
14 Bergson's metaphysics did inspire historical writing outside of the academy, notably in the 
prose and poetry of the French idealist writer Charales PBguy: Clio, dialogue de l'histoire 
et de ['&me paenne (1909) and MystPre de la charite' de Jeanne d'Arc (1910). 
15 Alain Guerreau summarized the methodological principles of the Ecole des chartes at the 
end of his very stimulating discussion of the evolution of French historiography.: "Cette 
mBthode reposait sur trois piliers: principe de non-intervention; principe de non-contradic- 
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was divisible: the past was distinct from the present. Since the past no longer existed, 
written documents from the past were considered as epistemologically autonomous 
and they constituted the sole basis of an historical discourse of proof. The division in 
time was absolute: the historian in the present could not change the past, he or she 
could merely uncover it. Thus, the divisible nature of time meant a denial of the 
historicity of the historian. Furthermore, since the historian was not in history, the 
past was not only empirically verifiable, but singular. Limited only by the existence 
of adequate documentation, the past could be reconstructed. This "illusion of a 
strictly cumulative science" l6 meant that time could not be indeterminate, for if time 
is divisible and singular, it must have a definite, identifiable direction. Determinate, 
singular and divisible, time for the historian was the antithesis of Bergsonian time. 
Bergson's conceptualisation of time and memory represented a profound chal- 
lenge to French historical theory and method. First, it meant fundamentally rethinking 
the epistemological status of knowledge of the past. For if time is non-cyclical and 
has no fixed direction, then what the future might hold is unknown, but the continuity 
of movement means it will not be the same as either the past or the present. Thus 
every past moment is unique. Furthermore, if the present is necessarily different, 
although not distinct, from the past, then any historical method impliesan irnposition 
of the present on the past, because we apprehend and comprehend the pastthrough 
our consciousness in the present. Hence any historical knowledge is necessarily 
relative, not absolute and the historian can neither objectively reconstruct nor recreate 
the past. 
This reintroduction of historicity with a vengeance raised a two-fold problem for 
historical theory and method, which Bergson.identified as early as his now-lost 1913 
lectures at Columbia University.17 On the one hand, there is a retroactive self-valida- 
tion of the present, whereby the present throws its shadow over the past, highlighting 
certain aspects while obscuring others. As aresult, an illusion of causal relationships, 
which appear to link the past to the present, is created and the past is thereby 
rnisrepresented.I8 On the other hand, since the present is not predetermined, it was 
tion; principe de plausibilit6. Non-intervention: I'Histoire est ce qu'elle est, son dkcoupage 
est indiffkrcnt; 1'8rudit choisit sont sujet, applique sa mBthode critique aux documents, pas 
B 1'Institution dont ce document Bmane, [...l Non-contradiction: si deux assertions ou deux 
documents concernant le m&me fait sont contradictoires, l'un des deux au moins est faux et 
doit 6tre rejete; inversement deux documents dont on peut montrer qu'ils sont independants 
et qui rapportent le  m6me fait de la m&me manikre valent preuve. [...l PlausibilitB: dans les 
cas ou l e  principe precedent n'est pas applicable clairement, [...l on s'en remet au bon sens 
pour distinguer I'historique du lkgendaire." Le Fe'odalisme: Un horizon the'orique (Paris 
1980), 169. 
16 Ibid., 144. My translation. 
17 In his 1934 collection of essays La Pensee et le mouvant, Bergson refers, in a footnote, to 
these questions as already having been explored in these lectures. (Oeuvres, 1264). Only a 
partial rCsum6 of one of these lectures, in English, has survived. (Me'langes, 978-989). 
18 "Par le seul fait de s'accomplir, la rBalitB projette derrikre elle son ombre dans le pass6 
indefiniment lointain; elle parait ainsi avoir prBexist6, sous forme de possible, 5 sa propre 
realisation. De 18 une erreur qui vicie notre conception du passe; de 121 notre pretention 
d'anticiper en toute occasion l'avenir. [...l Pour prendre un exemple simple, rien ne nous 
emp&che aujourd'hui de rattacher le romantisme du XIXe sikcle B ce qu'il y avait dBjB de 
romantique chez les classiques. Mais I'aspect romantique du classicisme ne s'est digage 
que par l'effet retroactif du romantisme une fois apparu. S'il n'y avait pas eu un Rousseau, 
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not the only possible outcome of the past and so to expect evidence from the past to 
explain clearly our present is to assume that people in the past could correctly foresee 
the then-indeterminate future.I9 
This two-fold problem arose directly from an acceptance of the temporally-rela- 
tive nature of knowledge and it in turn raised the question of the limits, indeed 
validity, of any scientific understanding of the past. Following his 1922 debate with 
Einstein, Bergson's own work became increasingly metaphysical and spiritualist. The 
fact that Bergson would effectively renounce the feasibility of a scientific historical 
discourse of proof did not mean, however, that all was lost. Historians could still 
develop a Bergsonian historical theory and method, because of the role he had 
accorded memory; but, such a solution was dependent on a recognition of the 
historian being in history. 
As we have seen, the prevailing orthodoxy in French historiography denied the 
indeterminate, heterogeneous, and indivisible nature of time. In so doing, it also 
effectively placed both memory and the historian outside history. In contrast, Berg- 
sonian philosophy stressed the temporal continuity of movement and said that it was 
only through memory that the active becoming of individual creativity understands 
reality. Thus, an understanding of the past does not exist in the abstract; the past can 
be understood only through the active, conscious creativity of the mind of the 
historian in the present. Two important implications for historical theory and method 
potentially arose from this recognition of the primacy and agency of the historian's 
intuitive understanding. First, the mind would provide not only the single point of 
entry to the past, but also the key to understanding those who peopled the past. 
Second, an historical document should not be conceived as being epistemologically 
autonomous. Therefore, aBergsonian historical epistemology would require not only 
a non-determinist perception of reality as temporal, but through a recognition of the 
historian being in history, it meant an enhanced appreciation of the importance of 
psychological factors and a new definition of what constitutes historical evidence. It 
was precisely in these areas that the founders of the Annales school made their greatest 
contributions to historical theory and method. 
Towards a Critical Historiography: The early years of the Annales 
The fundamentally conservative structure of the French historical profession initially 
withstood the changed circumstances of the immediate post-war world. When change 
un Chateaubriand, un Vigny, un Victor Hugo, non seulement on n'aurait jamais aperGu, 
mais encore il n ' y  aurait re'ellement pas eu de romantisme des classiques d'autrefois [...l 
L e  romantisme a op6r6 retroactivement sur le classicisme [...l retroactivement il a cr& sa 
propre prtfiguration dans le passt, et une explication de lui-m6me par ses anttcidents." 
Oeuvres ,  1264-65. Emphases in the original. 
19 "Nous transmettons aux generations futures ce qui nous intkresse, ce que notre attention 
considere et m6me dessine B la lumikre de notre tvolution passee, mais non pas ce que 
l'avenir aura rendu pour eux inttressant par la crtation d'un inttr&t nouveau, par une 
direction nouvelle irnprimee B leur attention. En d'autres termes enfin, les origines histori- 
ques du present, dans ce qu'il a de plus important ne sauraient 6tre complBtement Blucidees, 
car  on ne les reconstituerait dans leur inttgralite que si le pass6 avait pu 6tre exprime par 
les contemporains en fonction d'un avenir indttermini qui etait, par 18 m&me, impr6visi- 
ble." Ibid., 1266. 
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came, it was from outside the traditional centers of academic power in France and it 
succeeded only through the continued struggles of its leading proponents. Thus, the 
historiography on the Annales school has tended to focus on the divergent personali- 
ties of Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre. They were undoubtedly an odd pair, but one 
should not overlook the significance of their common life experiences. Despite their 
difference in age, both were members of what Bloch would call, in retrospect, the 
Dreyfus generation. Both had been students at the ~ c o l e  normale supe'rieure and then 
researchers at the Fondation Thiers. At the ~ c o l e  they were trained in geography by 
Vidal de la Blache and in philosophy by Bergson. In the work of both Bloch and 
Febvre the influence of Vidal's critical handling of spatial determinates and 
Bergson's definition of temporal reality would enjoy an uneasy CO-existence. Both 
Bloch and Febvre had their academic careers interrupted by the war. They both served 
in the trenches and each had attained the rank of Captain by war's end. In 1920, when 
Febvre was appointed professor of late medieval and early renaissance history at what 
was effectively a new university in Strasbourg, it was not all that surprising that he 
found in his younger medievalist colleague a scholar with whom he could collaborate. 
The most important fruit of this twenty-year collaboration was the Annales 
d'histoire 6conomique et sociale founded in 1929. The Annales was, in the inter-war 
years, what Past and Present would be in the 1950s and 1960s and History Workshop 
Journal would be the late 1970s and early 1980s. It was the single most important 
review in the discipline, not because it was the most prestigious, but because it was 
the most innovative. The Annales in the inter-war years was a forum where historians 
and social scientists critically examined the basis of historical knowledge and in so 
doing significantly redefined historical theory and method. They took as their starting 
point Febvre's famous maxim, there is no history only historians. They stressed the 
importance of psychological factors which, when combined with Bloch's dramatic 
denial of the uniqueness and centrality of the written document, brought western 
historical praxis into the 20th century. 
Implicit in this redefinition of historical theory and method was a worldview 
consistent with the ideas of Henri Bergson. Their programme of action presupposed 
the validity of Bergsonian time and memory. It was, however, a programme that 
would never be completed; indeed I will argue it was consciously abandoned by 
Lucien Febvre in 1949. The subsequent direction of the review, particularly under 
Fernand Braudel, would have antithetical philosophical bases, which purported to 
find in "the dialectic of time spans" an explanation of human society "in all its 
reality."20 This fundamental realignment was strongly influenced by the context of 
the Cold War, but it also had deeper, intellectual roots. I think that despite important 
shared beliefs, Bloch and Febvre differed in their handling of the challenge posed by 
Bergson and as a result the historical theory and method of the early Annales was 
significantly more ambiguous than the historiography would lead one to believe. 
For both Bloch and Febvre the dialectic of mind and material reality was central 
to their project of a new history. In their analysis of this relationship there was never 
20 Fernand Braudel, "History and the Social Sciences: The longue durke" in On History. 
Translated by Sarah Matthews. (Chicago 1980) 38. The article originally appeared in 
Annales E.S. C., 1958. 
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any doubt where the primacy lay. With Bergson, they argued for the unique creative 
capacity of the mind: the mind of the historian as point of departure and the minds of 
those who lived in the past as the primary object of historical inquiry. They argued 
that if we are to understand why people did things in the past, we have to understand 
how their minds worked, or what Febvre called their outillage mental (mental 
equipment). Writing in Annales as late as 1941, Febvre explored this dialectic: 
For the historian cannot understand or make others understand the functioning of the 
institutions in a given period or the ideas of that period or any other unless he has 
that basic standpoint, which I for my part call the psychological standpoint, which 
implies the concern to link up all the conditions of existence of the men of any given 
period with the meanings the same men gave to their own ideas. [...l for the historian 
ideas and institutions are never data coming from the Eternal, they are historical 
manifestations of the human genius at a certain period under the pressure of 
circumstances which can never recur.21 
It had been precisely this question of a never re-ccuring time that had led Bergson 
to raise the dual epistemological problems for history of the present throwing a 
shadow over the past and of those who peopled the past being incapable of foreseeing 
the future. Febvre's handling of these problems was both technical and theoretical. 
His most forceful arguments stressed the importance of respecting the historical 
dimensions of the past. Febvre consistently argued, throughout his career, that "an 
individual can only be what his period and social environment allow him to be."22 
Lessons from the present, be they psychological or otherwise, should never be 
indiscriminately applied to the past. This theoretical stance on the second of 
Bergson's problems, however, was expressed in a manner which implied that one 
could, if careful, thereby also avoid the first of Bergson's  conundrum^.^^ In what was 
probably his most important work, Febvre argued that Rabelais could not have been 
an atheist because this was not a choice available to the people of sixteenth-century 
France.24 In this work, starting from the particular of Rabelais, Febvre expanded his 
analysis in an attempt to recreate the totality of the age. The epistemological and 
methodological implications of this approach are clear. If one could accumulate 
sufficient information about a particular period, then one could establish the nature 
of people's general conditions of existence, which would then permit one to under- 
stand both their mental processes and the options available to them. For Lucien 
Febvre, a broadly-based contextualised approach, which would come to be known as 
21 Lucien Febvre, A New Kind of History, from the writings of Febvre, Edited by Peter Burke 
and translated by K. Folca. (New York 1973), 19-20. 
22 How the period and the environment should be defined would change, but his belief in the 
importance of the relationship would remain. "History and Psychology", in Febvre, A New 
Kind uf History, 4 .  Originally published in the Encyclope'die frangaise, 1938. 
23 " [...l as soon as we refrain from projecting the present, that is our present, into the past [...l 
as soon as we set out to illuminate all the actions of social groups, and in the first instance 
their mental processes, by examining the general conditions of their existence, it is obvious 
that we shall be unable to accept for the historical period in question any of the descriptions 
or statements made by psychologists of today working on the basis of data provided for 
them by our own age." Ibid., 9. 
24 Lucien Febvre, Le probleme de l'incroyance au XVIe siicle: La re'ligion de Rabelais. (Paris 
1942). 
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histoire totale, provided the methodological solution to the epistemological problems 
Bergson's framework posed. As we shall see, this faith in the epistemological value 
of empirical research would constitute an important line of demarcation between 
Lucien Febvre and his long-time colleague, Marc Bloch. 
Bloch's reflections on the general problem posed by temporal relativism resolved 
the question by recourse to Bergsonian cognition. If reality is continual temporal 
movement, then the present exhibits the same characteristics of indeterminacy and 
heterogeneity as the past. A person trying to understand and to explain the present 
encounters the same epistemological difficulties as does the historian exploring the 
past. The problem is not therefore specific to history, rather it marks the limits of any 
scientific discourse of proof. To transcend these limitations is in effect to transcend 
the limitations of an intelligence developed to deal with the spatial, physical world. 
With Bergson, Bloch considered the "solidarity of the ages" to be "so effective that 
the lines of connection work both ways."*' The historian can only transcend the 
limitations of intelligence by recourse to the durke rkelle, that is by an intuitive and 
imaginative exploration of memory. Bloch provided an excellent example of this 
Bergsonian cognition, what he called "understanding the past by the present," in his 
discussion of warfare: 
For here, in the present, is immediately perceptible that vibranceof human life which 
only a great effort of imagination can restore to the old texts. I have many times read, 
and I have often narrated, accounts of wars and battles. Did I truly know, in the full 
sense of that word, did I knowffom within, before I myself had suffered the terrible, 
sickening reality, what it meant for an army to be encircled, what it meant for apeople 
to meet defeat? Before I myself had breathed the joy of victory in the summer and 
autumn of 1918 [...l did I truly know all that was inherent in that beautiful word? In 
the last analysis, whether consciously or no, it is always by borrowing from our daily 
experiences and by shading them, where necessary with new tints that we derive the 
elements which help us to restore the past.26 
Thus the subjective memory of the historian was essential for Bloch, indeed it 
provided the key in the present to truly understanding the past. Bloch did not, 
however, follow Bergson into the realms of purely metaphysical speculation. Not 
only knowing the past, but adapting the methods of history "as Bergson put it, 'to the 
very contours of reality'" remained for Bloch not only a feasible proposition, but the 
"ultimate aim of any science."27 The importance for Bloch of an intuitive under- 
25 Marc Bloch, The Historian's Craft, translated by Peter Putnam. (New York 1953). 43. 
Originally published in 1949 as Apologie pour l'hisroire ou mbfier d'historien. 
26 Ibid.,  44. Emphasis added. 
27 " [  ...l human time will never conform to the implacable uniformity or fixed divisions of 
clock time. Reality demands that its measurements be suited t o  the variability of its rhythm, 
and that its boundaries have wide marginal zones. It is only by this plasticity that history 
can hope to adapt its classifications, as Bergson put it, "to the very contours of reality": 
which is properly the ultimate aim of any science. [...l Historical facts are, in essence, 
psychological facts. Normally, therefore, they find their antecedents in other psychological 
facts. To be sure, human destinies are placed in the physical world and suffer the conse- 
quence thereof. Even where the intrusion of these external forces seems most brutal, 
however, their action is weakened or intensified by man and his mind. [...l However, there 
can be no psychology which confines itself to pure consciousness. [...l In a word, in history, 
as elsewhere, the causes cannot be assumed. They are to be looked for ..." Bloch, Ibid., 189, 
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standing of the past provided him with the basis for a significantly different resolution 
of Bergson's twin epistemological challenge than Febvre's empirically-driven meth- 
od. 
As part of "a glorious victory of mind over its material" Bloch used temporal 
relativism to deny the uniqueness of written documents. Since the past is understood 
from the present, then the vaunted epistemological autonomy of historical documents 
is false. This denial of a special character to written documents had two important 
repercussions. First, once stripped of this autonomy, the idea of a cumulative, 
empirically valid, singular past based on these documents was exposed as illusory. 
In its stead stood the past in all its heterogeneity. Second, on the basis of this 
recognition of the complexity of the past, Bloch argued for a dramatic enlargement 
of the definition of historical evidence, to include all the myriad tracks of the past.29 
If the historian was no longer limited to finding the explanation for future events in 
the written documents from the past, then Bergson's second order of problems, those 
posed by the past being incapable of foreseeing the future, could potentially be 
circumvented. The creative, intuitive and analytical possibilities opened up for the 
historian by these tracks share a single common feature. The evidence exists in the 
present. This continuity of the past into the present must of course be both critically 
analysed and intuitively questioned, but it also showed the path to be followed, 
backwards in time.30 
The epistemological implications of Bloch's methodology are significant. No 
amount of empirical research can, in and of itself, ever provide a knowledge of the 
past in its totality. Rather, through a critical and intuitive reading of historical 
evidence, one establishes in the present a creative understanding and appreciation of 
the richness and meaning of the past. Knowledge of people and societies of the past 
is therefore neither absolute nor objective. It is, however, both potentially real and 
respectful of the totality of the past, inasmuch as one achieves through this intuitive, 
intellectual exercise a linkage between the living present of the historian and the past 
as part of the temporal continuity of being. This transcendence of the present 
reintegrates past and present into the totality of the durke rkelle. 
Marc Bloch defined history as the science of humans in time. His theory and 
method was strongly influenced by Bergson's concepts of time and memory. Ulti- 
mately then, both the limits of his science and the manner of their transcendence were 
to be found in the very nature of the durge rkelle. Marc Bloch's theory and method 
194 & 197. 
28 Ibid., 64.  
29 Bloch's metaphor of tracks is itself significant. Dead animals don't leave tracks and while 
where they lead might be unknown, they do go somewhere. In a like manner the Bergsonian 
past is living, indeterminate but not directionless, and made up of choices made in the 
material world. 
30 "For the natural progression of all research is from the best (or least badly) understood to 
the most obscure. [...l Here, as elsewhere, it is change which the historian is seeking to 
grasp. But in the film which he is examining, only the last picture remains quite clear. In 
order to reconstruct the faded features of the others, it behooves him first to unwind the 
spool in the opposite direction from that in which the pictures were taken." Ibid., 45-46. 
Again the metaphor is evocative of Bergson, who repeatedly had recourse to the same 
metaphor, particularly in his defence of the temporal direction of reality, because "le 
mecanisme de notre connaissance usuelle est de nature cinCmatographique." Oeuvres, 753. 
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differed from those of his long-time colleague Lucien Febvre. Where Febvre hoped 
to resolve the problem of the present throwing its shadow over the past primarily 
through empirical research, Bloch had recourse to memory. So that although both 
recognized the importance of the psychological dimension, Bloch's solution was 
more rigourously consistent within the Bergsonian paradigm. Bloch never tired of 
saying that his chosen discipline was in its infancy. I think the importance of Bloch's 
conceptualisation of history lay in its evocation of a creative, oppositional humanism, 
rather than as an achievable research programme. As such it retains great merit, for 
it serves to remind us of the creative potential inherent in the human spirit. On 16 
June 1944, in a field outside Lyon, if the Gestapo did know not who, they certainly 
knew what they were trying to kill. 
From the durbe rielle to the longue durie 
The voluntarist climate of Liberated Paris was a time for new beginnings. The 
Annules too faisaitpeau neuve and changed its name to Annales Economies Sociktks 
Civilisations. The first issue opened with a manifesto addressed to readers and friends 
in which Febvre surveyed the state of the world and concluded with the following 
definition of an historian: 
The only one worthy of h i s  beautiful name is one who throws himself [sic] into all 
of life, with the sense that in plunging into it, bathing in it, penetrating humanity's 
present, he increases tenfold his investigative capacities and his power to resurrect 
the past. A past thatholds within it, and which in exchange gives back to the historian, 
the secret meaning of human destinies." 
As the empowering Bergsonian optimism evident in this passage clearly indicates 
the Second World War did not result in a break with the philosophy of Henri Bergson 
on the part of the Annales. This optimistic and oppositional humanism, however, 
would not survive the very changed intellectual climate of the early Cold War years. 
It is rare in the history of thought to be able to give a precise date to a significant 
change. Ideas are more of an age than of a particular moment. Even when a date of 
publication provides a clear indication of the entry into the public domain of an idea, 
more often than not the period of incubation appears on closer examination to have 
been quite a long one. So it is with some degree of trepidation that I advance the date 
of 1949 as marking the abandonment by the Annales of Bergsonian philosophy and 
the adoption of an antithetical historical theory and method. In advancing this date I 
base myself on Lucien Febvre's important and, I think, quite remarkable article Vers 
une autre h i ~ t o i r e . ~ ~  
Febvre wrote the article when he was seventy-one years old. His years of greatest 
productivity were behind him and he was about to retire from his Chair in the History 
of Civilisation at the ColVge de France. It was not a propitious moment to set off in 
new directions and yet the structure of the piece clearly indicates that this was his 
31 Annales E.S.C., 1 ,  (1946), 8. My translation, which differs substantially from the edited 
version in Hughes, The Obstructed Path, 60. 
32 Originally published in the Revue de rne'taphysique et de morale it was reprinted in Combats 
pour l'histoire (Paris 1953) and in translation, under the title " A  New Kind of History," 
was the centerpiece for Burke's collection, from which all quotations are taken, 27-43. 
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intention, although in conclusion, he admitted that he might not be able to accompany 
the voyage. At one level the piece is simply an extended review of two books that 
were published in 1949: Bloch's posthumous Apologie pour l'histoire ou m&tier 
d'historien andFernandBraudel's thesis La Mkditerranke et le monde mkditerrane'en 
h l 'kpoque de Phillipe II. At another level the piece is a laying on of hands, for within 
the year Braudel would be elected to Febvre's Chair. At yet another level the piece 
could be read as a defence of team-work in history, one which uses the individual 
works of an acknowledged master and a brillant pupil to call for greater co-ordination 
and organisation of historical research. 
In the historiography of the Annales these differing levels are related: the execution 
of Febvre's younger colleague had deprived him of his logical successor and Braudel 
was a brillant younger scholar who was in the right place at the right time. This 
perspective stresses the continuity of the Annales school and suggests that the third 
level of discourse in the article merely points out how the careers of Bloch and 
Braudel would have been all the more fruitful, if they had had the opportunity to head 
up historical laboratories rather than working in isolation. Alain Guerreau was closer 
to the mark when he observed "the triple-timed engine of Braudel was created at the 
right moment, it earned its ingenious inventor the highest honours and the inheritance 
of Lucien F e b ~ r e . " ~ ~  For Braudel's division of historical time into three major 
components, geographical time, social time and individual time was certainly inno- 
vative, but it was more than that. I think Febvre, more than any other historian, 
realized just how "autre" or "new" it really was. 
Febvre's call for large research teams to work on a variety of complex historical 
issues in a comparative context was not in itself new. He had made it as early as his 
1936 inaugural lecture at the Collbge de France and it was a common feature of his 
reflections on method during the late 1930's and early 1940's. A strongly hierarchical 
structure was, however, central to Febvre's vision of collective research. Witness his 
1943 definition of the task: "The work to be done must be collective; I mean there 
must be an architect, a site foreman - and a host of labourers -carefully chosen, full 
of zeal and imbued with the master's ideas."34 In his extended discussion of method 
in the Apologie, Bloch did not endorse this particular vision of research and instead 
looked forward to a time when scholars, animated by a team spirit, could collaborate 
on specific  question^.^' In his review of Apologie Febvre chose to ignore the quite 
different political and philosophical positions underlying these contradictory visions. 
Instead, he treated Bloch's failure to endorse a corporate model of research as merely 
a lapsus stemming from the mental depression Febvre alleged was then affecting 
Bloch: 
But circumstances and that kind of withdrawal into himself which he experienced on 
the morrow of 1940, removal from his normal surroundings and the need to collect 
his thoughts rather than develop outwards probably explain his silence on this point 
which in no way detracts from the strength and purposefulness of his meditations, 
though it does date them. Since 1945 we have lived through years which have each 
been the equivalent of ten. People think of themselves as being in the vanguard when 
33 Guerreau, Le FCodalisme, p.  143. M y  translation. 
34 Febvre, A New Kind, 270. 
35 Bloch, The Historian's Craft,  69 .  
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the main part of the troops have already advanced, by hand, several miles further 0n.3~ 
I think that this was a deliberate misrepresentation of both Bloch's Apologie and what 
his larger work during the Second War was all about. Furthermore, I believe the 
elliptical reference to the vanguard is significant in understanding why Febvre felt it 
necessary to offer this singular explanation. 
Bloch considered the collapse of the French forces in the Spring of 1940 to have 
been a defeat of the French intellect.37 It was for Bloch a defeat that went far beyond 
the inability of the French General Staff to grasp the significance of mobility in an 
age of tank warfare. This particular and important failure was merely a symptom of 
a much larger malaise, which affected the entire French academic and intellectual 
world. Action was required on several different and related levels. Not only did he 
consider collaboration a b h ~ r e n t , ~ ~  but active participation in the Resistance would 
become a moral imperative. Furthermore, a searching intellectual self-criticism and 
renewal was essential and this was the leitmotiv of the entire Apologie. As we have 
seen, in this work Bloch returned to the basic principles of Bergsonian philosophy 
and produced not only an important piece on theory and method, but one which 
reasserted the importance and centrality of the creative potential of the individual. 
Febvre's suggestion that this exercise was a rejection of outward development was 
not only an incredible misrepresentation, but, coming as it did from a scholar who 
had continued to occupy the Chair in the History of Civilisation throughout the years 
of Occupation, it might well be seen as hyp~cri t ical .~~ 
Prior to the war, the Annales had been an important forum for intellectual 
exchange. Although neither of its founders could be even remotely construed as 
Marxist, a number of important Marxist scholars did publish in the jo~rnal .~" The 
36 Febvre, A New Kind, 33 -34 .  
37 See his penetrating analysis in The Strange Defeat (Oxford 1948). 
38 Bloch would break with Febvre over the continuation of the publication of the Annales in 
Occupied France. It should of course be noted that because Bloch was Jewish, continuation 
of the journal meant his name as a founder would have to be and was dropped from the 
masthead. It was an action that, although not taken lightly by Febvre, foreshadowed his 
subsequent rewriting of history. Fink's Marc Bloch, 241-292, contains significant new 
material on the acrimonious relationship between Febvre and Bloch during this period. 
39 It should be noted that Georges Duby, perhaps the most illustrious of Bloch's disciples in 
French medieval history, has recently strongly defended Febvre: "Je  lui rends grlce,  et je 
le  fais B voix d'autant plus haute que, dans le moment ou j'Bcris, [the summer of  19911 cet 
inimitable historien n 'a  pas bonne presse. Des gens qui ne savent pas ce que c'btait que 
tenir bon sous la  botte allemande pour ne pas baisser pavillon, lui reprochent son acharne- 
ment B maintenir les Annales en vie pendant I'occupation. On I'oppose B Marc Bloch dont 
on amplifie le rBle tandis que l 'on minimise le  sien. Or, s'il exista jamais une 'Bcole des 
Annales', ce fut bien grace i Lucien Febvre." L'histoire continue (Paris 1990), 116. If my 
interpretation is correct, then Duby would be right, but for the wrong reasons. The e'cole 
we know owes far more to Febvre and Braudel, than Bloch. More's the pity. 
40 Commenting on the contributions of Franz Borkenau, Paul Nizan, George Friedmann, 
Yoland Mayor, Georges MBquet, Maurice Halbwachs among others, in the 19301s, Alain 
Guerreau concluded "Des iddes, oui, mais pas n'importe quelles id6es. Sans doute, certains 
collaborateurs [to the review] avaient-ils des positions un tantinet flottantes ou ambigus, 
Lucien Febvre au premier chef; il n'en demeure pas moins que les sympathies e t  l'orienta- 
tion d'ensernble des Annales Btaient trks vigoureusement marqukes, et que c'est cet aspect- 
121 de la revue qui faisait bbgayer de rage les vieux canassons et les spadassins d e  la  plume 
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vanguard Febvre so disparagingly referred to, included those former colleagues and 
all the other intellectuals who still defended Marxism. Indeed, what made the changes 
wrought in the years between 1945 and 1949 seem so significant to Febvre was the 
fundamental geo-political re-orientation and division of Europe. In the new reality 
of the Cold War, Bloch's defence of an engaged humanist history might well appear 
dated to someone who had so accepted the norms of the new world order.41 These 
changes were also evocative of Braudelian geographic time and social time, for the 
Iron Curtain - at least along its northern line of descent - conformed to that most 
important division in modern European history: the second serfdom. It would not 
have been a coincidence lost on an historian of the calibre of Lucien F e b ~ r e . ~ ~  This 
recognition of the centrality of the longue dure'e resulted in a dramatic shift in focus 
and emphasis away from contemporary history in the pages of the journal. Prior to 
1949, excluding the war years, the Annales devoted more than half of its pages to 
recent, post-1815, historical issues. After 1949, contemporary history rarely ac- 
counted for more than a quarter of the review.43 
Febvre's call for a new type of history meant therefore a rejection not only of the 
legacy of his former colleague and the philosophical bases they had both shared, but 
also of much of his own past. It cannot have been an easy choice. It would appear, 
however, that the importance and urgency he attached to the issues left him little 
alternative."" Nevertheless the language, even for an article by Febvre, was extraor- 
qui se partageaient alors le devant de la sckne historiographique." Guerreau, Le Fdodalisme, 
122. 
41 Febvre's vision of the future of historical research included the following: "the alert and 
flexible research director who, having received a very broad education, having been trained 
to seek in history material with which to look for solutions to the great problems of life 
which societies and civilizations come up against daily, will be able to map out any 
investigation, put the right questions, point to precise sources of information, and, having 
done that, estimate expenditure, control the rotation of equipment, establish the number of 
staff in each team and launch his workers into a search for the unknown. Within two, three 
or four months, everything will have been gathered in. And then the processing begins - 
study of microfilms, recording on index cards, preparation of maps, statistics and graphs, 
comparison of historical material as such with linguistic, psychological, ethnological, 
archeological and botanical material, etc. which may assist the work. Six months or may 
be a year later and the investigation is ready for presentation to the public." Febvre, A New 
Kind, 33.  Hughes, who knew whereof he spoke (from 1946 to 1948 he headed up the 
American State Department's European research division), commenting on this particular 
article by Febvre, observed that "it could have been written by an American foundation 
executive." The Obstructed Path, 57. 
42 This renewed importance of old divisions strongly influenced historiographic debates in the 
West, most notably in the first round of the Transition Debate and then in the development 
of the Atlantic Revolution school. I have analysed the historicity of these debates in 
"Internal Dynamics and the International Cycle: Questions of the transition in Montrtal, 
1821-1828." Ph.D. Thesis, McGill University, 1985, 53-70. 
43 After 1949, contemporary history was prominent in only four years of the journal's 
production (1952,58,64 and 66) and in these years it never reached the heights of the earlier 
period when in certain years recent history accounted for more than 65% of the journal's 
contents. H. L. Wesseling, "The Annales School and the Writing of Contemporary His- 
tory," in Review, 1: 314. (1978), 186. 
44 "Encouragement from outside, lessons drawn from philosophy [such as Bergson?] or 
warnings given by historians who went before us [Marc Bloch for instance?] will never 
bring about a change of outlook and attitude in the world of historians and lead to profound 
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dinary and it serves to remind us of the emotional costs that were involved. In his 
conclusion, Febvre discussed the role, scope and importance of history. (An issue 
which he felt Bloch had dealt with in too technical a manner!) After reflecting briefly 
on the social reality of demography, the "copulations, rapes, brutal mixtures and 
normal unions" that constitute its history, he wondered how long we remember and 
concluded: 
But we have an instinct which leads us away from all that. An instinct warns us not 
to let ourselves be  hypnotized, infatuated and absorbed by the past. It tells us that it 
is essential for human groups and societies to forget if they wish to survive. We have 
to live. W e  cannot allow ourselves to be crushed under the tremendous, cruel, 
accumulated weight of all that we inherit, that is, through the irrestible pressure of 
the dead on the living, flattening the thin layer of the present under their weight, to 
the point where the living are robbed of all resistance. [...l History in the last resort 
meets the same need as tradition, whether the need is conscious or no. History is a 
way of organizing the past so that it does not weigh too heavily on the shoulders of 
men. [.. .] For history has no choice in the matter it systematically gathers in, classifies 
and assembles past facts in accordance with its present needs. It consults death in 
accordance with the needs of life?5 
How quintessentially modern is the irony of Febvre's use of a Bergsonian explanation 
of why we forget to redefine history as teleological process. Here Febvre used the 
urgency of action in the present, indeed treating it as a question of survival, to justify 
a dramatic rejection of the appositional humanism inherent in Bergson's living past. 
What's Been Lost and What's Been Gained? 
I have been arguing that there was not one, but at least two Annules schools. The 
abandonment of the durke rkelle and the endorsement of the logic of the longue durke 
transformed the theory and method of the Annales. This transformation can in 
retrospect be seen as having its roots in the differing solutions to Bergson's twin 
problems for historical theory and method proposed by the Annales founders. 
Nevertheless, although less rigourous, Febvre's work had also shared in the 
Bergsonian optimism of his long-time colleague. Thus it is appropriate to illustrate 
how different the two Annales were by contrasting two articles, both on the topic of 
civilisation, the first written by Febvre in 1930 and the second by Braudel in 1958.46 
Febvre's article attempted to explain why we have two different meanings for the 
transformations in history, which are so apt to be thwarted in a country like ours as a result 
of university traditions. Repeated blows are needed. What is needed is a continuous 
harassment of contemporary man by means of history, an effective sort of history and one 
which takes on an active role in the consciousness of all. There will be protests at first. 
There will be ridicule. And then people will begin to think. And then we can start, play and 
win." Febvre, A New Kind, 39. 
45 Ibid . ,  40-41. 
46 Febvre's Civilisation: l' ivolutzon d'un mot et des i d i e s  was first published in Premikre 
semaine internationale de synthdse, Part 2 ,  1930 and was reprinted in Pour une histoire ri 
part ent i ire  (Paris 1962) and in translation in Febvre, A New Kind, 219-257. Braudel's 
L'histoire des  civilisations, le pass6 explique le pre'sent was first published as a chapter of 
the Encyclope'die francaise and was reprinted in ~ r i t s  ur l'histoire (Paris 1969) and 
translated in Braudel, On History, 177-218. 
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word civilisation. The first is plural, particular and refers to a social formation, i.e. 
French or Aztec civilisation. The second is singular, universal and linked to a concept 
of progress, i.e. civilisation as opposed to barbarism. Both senses of the word are 
surprisingly new and the latter preceeded the former. Civilisation, in the sense of a 
well-ordered society, became current only in the last quarter of the 18th century. The 
word first appeared in print in 1766, in French, and then spread quite rapidly finding 
greater acceptance in English than in German. Civilisation was unknown to Rous- 
seau, Voltaire, Montaigne and others of the Enlightenment, who used a combination 
of words - interestingly enough most frequently police'- to convey something similar. 
But, and the details need not detain us here, the resonance of progress was in large 
measure absent from these earlier terms. The idea of there being civilisations, in the 
plural, first appeared in the early nineteenth century and was apparently strongly 
influenced by the work of George C ~ v i e r . ~ ~  
Braudel was also interested in the origin and meaning of civilisation, but his 
approach was radically different from that of his erstwhile mentor. He started out by 
linking civilisation to culture and suggested that the words, although often overlap- 
ping, frequently are in competition. After a cursory exploration of the history of the 
word civilisation, he proceded to the heart of the matter. The way Franqois Guizot, 
Jacob Burckhardt, Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, Alfred Weber and Philip 
Bagby each approached the relationship between civilisation and culture was exam- 
ined in turn. There is a chronological order here; however, the analysis was not 
historical, but conceptual. The merits and the short-comings of each person's ap- 
proach were discussed in order to deduce a general model of what civilisation means. 
Not surprisingly, Braudel proposed a three-part model for the analysis of civilisation: 
cultural areas, borrowings andrefusals. Civilisations are first of all geographic spaces, 
which share certain cultural features. Cultural elements are, however, constantly on 
the move between areas and there is a great deal of borrowing from differing spaces. 
Nevertheless, certain elements are not borrowed. Civilisations can and do refuse 
innovation from outside and this refusal is the third important defining characteristic 
of the model. In conclusion, Braudel discussed how this conceptual model might 
facilitate inter-disciplinary research into the nature and evolution of civilisations. 
My point here is a simple one. For Febvre, the creation of the idea of civilisation 
and its subsequent evolution, whereby it came to mean two quite different things, 
was an historical problem, that is a problem of temporal dimensions susceptible to 
explanation. For Braudel, the question was fundamentally conceptual and only 
incidentally historical: if an adequate model could be developed that was consistent 
with the past, one could explain both the present and the future. These two approaches 
represented two quite different and antithetical historical theories and methods. 
Through a detailed and attentive listening to the usage of the term civilisation in 
a wide variety of sources, Febvre argued that we can begin to understand how people 
who lived in the past viewed not only this word, but their world. The focus on the 
outillage mental of particular people living in society was deliberate, for it permitted 
an analytical understanding and appreciation of the creative processes that were under 
47 A greatly misunderstood thinker, (see  Gould, Time's Arrow) from whom I have argued 
historians still have a lot to  learn; Les relations ville/compagne: le cas du buis de chaufjage 
(MontrCal 1988), xciv-cix. 
Time and Human Agency 8 1 
way. Braudel did not attempt to understand the historical context of the differing 
thinkers he discussed, because he did not conceive of their ideas as historical prod- 
ucts. Indeed, he explicitly denied the possibility of understanding such constructs 
in human terms.@ Rather, he treated these writings as attempts, for the most part 
failed, to transcend the particular of individual life in order to grasp the importance 
of the general phenomenon of civilisation, which alone had historical significance. 
Clearly, Braudel's theory and method in this piece excluded any serious consid- 
eration of memory within history. Nor is this surprising, for Braudel was the histo- 
rian who had compared the historical importance of individual human experience 
to fireflies lighting up a beach: potentially dramatic and beautiful, but essentially 
e~hemeral.4~ What might not be so clear, is the corollary. The denial of the central- 
ity of individual human experience resulted in an emphasis on spatial determinates 
and structural influences. Rather than reality being conceived as continuous, 
temporal movement, his approach presumed spatial immobility wherein change 
could come only very slowly. Thus, since people's creative choices were no longer 
conceived as the central integrative aspect unifying human life with this larger 
temporal movement of reality, human agency lost both its epistemological and 
historical significance. In its place, Braudel proposed the social mathematics of 
game theory, informed by a concentration on place and a recognition of the central- 
ity of the longue d~re 'e .~~'  It was an epistemology wherein a scientific discourse of 
proof consisted of cybernetic models that recognized not an historical time, but a 
supra-human time, "a mathematical, godlike time [...l external to men."51 
If it would be difficult to find a less Bergsonian conceptualisation of time than 
that espoused by Fernand Braudel, this did not mean his theory and method repre- 
sented a complete break with the conceptual and political programme of the early 
Annales. In the work of both Febvre and Bloch geography was conceived histori- 
cally. Spatial determinates were not immutable, but rather socially determined and 
hence could be modified over time. In the best of the Annales later work, this 
legacy of Vidal de la Blache remained an important element. Similarly, a recogni- 
tion of the centrality of social history characterised the best work of the two 
schools. Furthermore, the importance of inter-disciplinary dialogue which the early 
Annales had championed was also a part of the very significant achievements of the 
later Annales school, in the 1950's and 1960's. As Febvre foresaw, this dialogue 
established history at the heart of the human sciences in France. Despite these 
shared characteristics and the evident gains of those years, however, the theory and 
method of the later Annales constituted a qualitatively different approach to the 
fundamental questions of what does it mean to understand and to explain historical 
processes of change. 
48 His discussion of the meaning of the present was quite explicit in this regard: "Let us not judge this 
present on the scale of our own individual lives, in the daily slices, thin, insignificant and translu- 
cent, represented by our own personal existence. On the scale of civilizations and of all other 
collective constructs, quite other measurements must be used, in order to comprehend and grasp 
them." Braudel, On History, 214. 
49 This analogy was advanced in his inaugural lecture at the College de France, December, 1950. 
Ibid., 10. 
50 Braudel, "History and the Social Sciences: The longue dure'e." in Ibid., 25-54. 
51 Ihill AX 
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A dialectical relationship between the individual and society was at the heart of 
the early Annales theory and method. To understand historical processes of change 
meant understanding how people saw the possibilities and constraints they faced. 
To explain historical processes of change meant explaining how and why people 
took advantage of certain possibilites and not of others in their creative evolution- 
ary modification of those constraints. The primacy of this dialectical relationship 
meant that the social was not conceived as a separate or pre-existing construction 
upon which the individual had some influence, but rather the social was people in 
time. In contrast, Braudel's "triple-timed engine" of geographic time, social time 
and individual time placed the emphasis upon the pre-constructed, already existing 
constraints of spatial and social determinates. Although not immutable, these deter- 
minates operated according to rythmns and logics which belonged to an order of 
things beyond that of the individual human experience. To understand and explain 
historical processes of change in this perspective meant above all understanding 
and explaining the relationship between these largely quantifiable, supra-human 
determinates. No longer the key to understanding the fundamental nature of reality, 
individual human experience paled in significance. Ironically, this meant both a 
lengthening and a flattening of historical time. Since that which was most impor- 
tant operated on the time scales of the longue durke, the perspective was opened 
onto vast stretches of human history. Research into these long-time spans, 
however, necessarily focused on the quantifiable as opposed to the qualitative 
aspects of historical experience. In short, by stressing continuity and structure the 
second Annales school effectively eschewed the significance of historical speci- 
ficity. Ultimately this paradigmatic shift would lead to a denial of the need for an 
epistemology proper to history.52 
This effective denial of the importance of human agency and historical specificity, 
in favour of the perspective of the longue dure'e, greatly facilitated the search for a 
new common ground with the social sciences. Thus, there was a qualitative differ- 
ence between the inter-disciplinary dialogues engaged in by the two Annales 
schools. In the early Annales the dialogue focused to a significant degree on the 
historical nature of socio-economic and political problems facing progressive 
scholarship. In the inter-disciplinary dialogue of the later Annales it was precisely 
these pre-war schools of the social sciences, which had stressed the importance of 
social change, that were notable by their absence. Their place was taken by newer 
schools within the social sciences; schools which reflected in their own fields a 
parallel paradigmatic shift away from human agency and social change, towards 
questions of social control, structure and immobilities; schools which privileged 
the use of abstract models and supra-human explanations of causality. 
52 As Pierre Chaunu expressed it in the 1964 founding manifesto of serial history: "Pour I'historien 
comme pour chaque combattant de cette Sociologie vraiment globale, ~Critablement explicative, 
done vraiment utile, qui malgrC instituts, projets et discours demeure une promesse refugiCe encore 
dans un avenir impricis, l'Cpist6mologie est une tentation qu'il faut rCsolument savoir Ccarter. 
L'experience de ces demikres annCes ne semble-t-elle pas prouver qu'elle peut &tre solution de 
paresse chez ceux qui vont s'y perdre avec delice - une ou deux brillantes exceptions ne font que 
confirmer la regle - signe d'une recherche qui piCtine et se stCrilise?'Histoire quantitative, histoire 
sCrielle (Paris 1978), 11. 
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The fundamental re-orientation of the Annales in the early years of the Cold War 
was not an isolated event. The success of Braudel's new approach in history was 
paralleled by that of LCvi-Strauss in anthropology, Skinner in psychology, 
Chomsky in linguistics and Popper in philosophy - to name but the most promi- 
nent architects of what was to become the new intellectual order in Western acade- 
mic thought. The remarkable success and influence gained by these new interpre- 
tive frameworks has objectively impeded a critical, historical understanding of 
their development. In a manner which illustrates well Bergson's perceptive 
comments on the self-validation of the present in the past, these schools appear as 
the crowning achievements of a progressive evolution within their respective 
fields, rather than as representing significant breaks with earlier critical 
approaches; breaks whose historical specificity necessarily raises the question of 
the limitations that a dominant social order imposes on the development of the 
human sciences. In 1845, Karl Marx observed that the dominant ideas of an age are 
those of the dominant social class. My, perhaps all too summary, critical evalution 
of the evolution of the most important school in twentieth-century historical theory 
and method would certainly suggest that his observation retains great merit. Nor, I 
suggest, would a larger critical re-assessment of the dialectical interaction between 
the conjuncture of the Cold War and the development of other schools of critical 
thought in the academy prove him wrong. As we undertake this critical re-assess- 
ment, so necessary for the creation of a truly human science, I believe a respect for 
human agency in its historical specificity, which was also a hall-mark of the early 
Annales school, offers our best starting point. 
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